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Abstract
We remark that the Bellare-Rivest protocol for translucent cryptography [J. Cryptology
(1999) 12: 117-139] can not truly enable the government to decrypt partial encrypted commu-
nications.
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1 Introduction
The primitive of translucent cryptography introduced by Bellare and Rivest [2] is viewed as an
alternative to the controversial key-escrow techniques. It aims to achieve an appropriate balance
between individual privacy and government access to communications. The main idea behind their
protocol for the primitive can be described as follows.
Suppose that Bob’s public key is pkB and Larry’s public parameters are V1, · · · , Vt, where the
role of Larry is played by the government. Among these V1, · · · , Vt, only one is the good parameter
for Larry, i.e., he knows the relevant trapdoor. But nobody knows which is the good parameter
except Larry himself. When Alice wants to send a session key s to Bob, which shall be used for
the later symmetric encryption, she randomly picks a parameter Vi ∈ {V1, · · · , Vt} and a secret
exponent k and sends {gk, sykB; sVi
k, i}, where g is the generator of the ElGamal cryptosystem and
yB is Bob’s public key. If Vi is just the good parameter, then Larry shall successfully recover s.
Otherwise, Larry fails to recover it.
The Bellare-Rivest protocol is based on noninteractive fractional oblivious transfer and uses just
one ElGamal encryption. In the scenario, Larry plays the role of receiver. But we find the OT model
is not appropriate to this situation because: 1) the transferred messages is not recognizable for the
receiver, 2) the sender is not willing to disclose some messages to the receiver. Moreover, there is
short of a mechanism for ElGamal encryption to force the sender to invoke any Vi ∈ {V1, · · · , Vt}.
That means the sender can chose an index i, a secret exponent k and a random element Vˆ and
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generate the malformed ciphertext {gk, sykB ; sVˆ
k, i}. In such case, Bob can successfully recover
the session key s, but Larry can not recover it. Thus the Bellare-Rivest protocol for translucent
cryptography can not truly enable government to decrypt partial encrypted communications.
2 Description of the Bellare-Rivest protocol
The implementation of translucent cryptography based on noninteractive oblivious transfer will
not incur any “extra flows”. When Alice wishes to communicate with Bob, her only transmission
is to Bob. If the government wants to know something about what Alice is saying to Bob, it must
wiretap their communications, and then it will be able to decrypt a fraction of the messages it
picks up.
Global setup. The ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) picks a large global prime ρ (say at
least 1024 bits in length), a generator g of the multiplicative group Z∗ρ and a value U such that no
one knows the discrete logarithm logg(U) of U , modulo ρ.
Publication of Larry’s public parameters. Larry picks a secret exponent xL ∈ Zρ−1 and a random
index ℓ ∈ {1, · · · , t}, and computes Vℓ = g
xL mod ρ, Vj = VℓU
j−ℓ mod ρ, j = 1, · · · , t. Notice
that Vℓ is the only one good key for Larry. Only Larry knows its secret index ℓ. Any one can verify
that whether V1, · · · , Vt are well-formed by checking Vj/V1 = U
j−1 mod ρ, where j ∈ {2, · · · , t}.
Encryption. Suppose that Bob’s public key is yB = g
xB mod ρ, for some secret exponent
xB ∈ Zρ−1. When Alice wants to send a session key s to Bob, she picks a random exponent
k ∈ Zρ−1 and Vi ∈ {V1, · · · , Vt}, and sends the ciphertext {c1, c2; c3, i} = {g
k, sykB ; sV
k
i , i}.
Decryption for Bob. Bob computes s = c2/c
xB
1
mod ρ.
Decryption for Larry. If Vi is the good key for Larry, he computes s = c3/c
xL
1
mod ρ.
3 Remarks on the Bellare-Rivest protocol
From the practical point of view, the Bellare-Rivest Protocol has some drawbacks.
(1) Reveal of good key. It is easy to find that Larry’s security relies on the fact that Alice does
not know his secret index ℓ; if she did, she could encrypt using only the other keys, and Larry would
never be able to recover the session key s. Suppose that Larry needs to use the wiretap information
as evidence in a court case. The plaintexts are then revealed, and, by their examination, Alice can
determine which of her messages were decrypted. This tells her what Larry’s secret index is.
Bellare and Rivest [2] suggest that Larry have many public keys, with different keys used
in different programs or devices at different times. Clearly, this will incur heavy cost for key
management. This drawback renders the protocol unrealistic.
(2) Malformed ciphertext attack. In order to enable Larry (the government) to decrypt partial
encrypted communications, Alice must follow the translucent cryptography protocol properly. If
Alice generates the ciphertext as {gk, sykB; sVˆ
k, i} for some random element Vˆ /∈ {V1, · · · , Vt} and
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i 6= ℓ, then Larry can not find her trick. Even if i = ℓ, Larry can not recover the session key s.
Bellare and Rivest [2] suggest that Larry’s key should be digitally signed under some global
public key which is embedded in a commercially available crypto-box. Note that Larry’s key cannot
be embedded in the box because they may need to be changed now and then. Regretfully, they did
not specify the method to force Alice to invoke Larry’s key. In fact, it is impossible for ElGamal
cryptosystem to check the ciphertext {gk, sykB ; sV
k
i , i} is well formed, i.e., Vi is indeed invoked and
included in the third component. In short, the attack discounts greatly the importance of the
protocol.
4 Misused noninteractive fractional oblivious transfer
The oblivious transfer primitive is due to Rabin [4]. It has been formalized and extended by Even
et al. [3]. We pint out that in most reasonable applications of OT, the transferred messages must be
recognizable for the receiver, or the sender is willing to disclose some messages to the receiver. The
property has been explicitly specified in the earlier works. We refer to the following descriptions.
In Ref.[4], Rabin explained that:
Bob and Alice each have a secret, SB and SA, respectively, which they wish to
exchange. For example, SB may be the password to a file that Alice wants to access
(we shall refer to this file as Alice’s file), and SA the password to Bob’s file. To exclude
the possibility of randomizing on the possible digits of the password, we assume that if
an incorrect password is used then the file is erased, and that Bob and Alice want to
guarantee that this will not happen to their respective files.
In Ref.[3], Even, Goldreich and Lempel stressed that:
The notion of a “recognizable secret message” plays an important role in our def-
inition of OT. A message is said to be a recognizable secret if, although the receiver
cannot compute it, he can authenticate it once he receives it.
The notion of a recognizable secret message is evidently relevant to the study of
cryptographic protocols, in which the sender is reluctant to send the message while the
receiver wishes to get it. In such protocols, it makes no sense to consider the transfer of
messages that are either not secret (to the receiver) or not recognizable (by the receiver).
In symmetric case, such as exchanging secrets, signing contracts, both two participators can
easily verify the correctness of the received messages. In unsymmetric case, such as a database
manager plays the role of the sender and a client plays the role of the receiver, it is usual that the
sender is willing to disclose some messages to the receiver.
It claims that the Bellare-Rivest protocol is based on noninteractive oblivious transfer, which
is due to Bellare and Micali [1]. We here stress that the transferred session key s in their protocol
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is not recognizable (by the government). Besides, the sender (Alice) is reluctant to reveal s to the
government (Larry). Thus, the primitive of OT is not appropriate to this case. Frankly speaking,
the essential technique used in the Bellare-Rivest protocol is to mix some padding parameters with
the Larry’s true parameter (he knows the relevant trapdoor) such that others can not decide which
parameter is his true public key.
5 Conclusion
The Bellare-Rivest protocol for translucent cryptography seems impossible to implement although
interesting. We hope this note is helpful to clarify some misunderstandings about noninteractive
oblivious transfer as well as OT itself.
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